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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSO-
CIATION and GEORGE INGALLS, 
dba George's Market, 
Plailntiffs in Intervention 
amd Respondents, 
-vs.-
JAMES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super 
Market, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT JAMES L. BUSH 
djbja BUSH SUPER MARKET 
Appeal From the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District in and for the County of Weber 
Honorable Parley E. N orseth, Judge . 
. ,: . T 1[' n· ATHOL RAWLINS, 
F I I_..~ Jl! c. E. HENDERSON, : •. • ~ · ~.- 1o_f)RAY, RAWLINs, JoNES & HENDERSON, 
· AP\-< <..:. I'.:J'::A.ttorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 
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· of the Oregon Bar, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~RADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSO-
CIATION and GEORGE INGALLS, 
dba George's Market, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention Civil No. 7783 
and Respondents, 
-vs.-
JAMES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super 
Market, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT JAMES L. BUSH 
d/b/a BUSH SUPER MARKET 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The declared purpose of this action was to enjoin 
defendant from selling groceries below cost with the in-
tent or effect of injuring competitors and destroying 
competition in violation of the Unfair Practices Act 
(R. 1). The undeclared but only basis for the com-
plaint was that defendant issued S. & H. cash discount 
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stamps to customers who paid cash for certain staple 
items of groceries sold at the minimum markup required 
by the Act (R. 21 and 15). 
Defendant denied that he sold any groceries below 
cost or that he issued the stamps with the intent to 
injure his competitors or destroy competition. He also 
challenged the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices 
Act (R. 11). 
The trial took place on August 27 and 28, 1951, in 
the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, be-
fore the Honorable Parley E. N orseth, who handed down 
a memorandum decision, dated October 29, 1951, to the 
effect that defendant had violated the Act, as charged, 
and that the Act, although lacking in definiteness, was 
not so indefinite as to be "wholly unconstitutional" (R. 
15). In due course, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were stated (R. 20), an appropriate decree was 
entered (R. 24), and this appeal was filed (R. 27). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For more than fifty years, The Sperry and Hutchin-
son Company has made available to retail merchants 
throughout the United States a system which enables 
them to allow the equivalent of a cash discount on small 
as well as large purchases (R. 173-174). There is no 
coin small enough to provide for discounts on purchases 
under 50¢. The equivalent can be accomplished, how-
ever, through the use of stamps which serve as tokens. 
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Under the S. & H. contract, retail merchants are licensed 
to make use of the S. & H. Co-operative Cash Discount 
System by issuing S. & H. Co-operative Discount Stamps 
to customers who pay in cash or, in any event, on or be-
fore the 15th proximo. The purpose stated in the con-
tract is to make available to the merchant ''a Co-opera-
tive Cash Discount System whereby there may be offered 
to retail customers a cash discount on all cash payments, 
irrespective of their amount, thereby inviting and re-
warding cash or prompt payment for goods sold, decreas-
ing the merchant's losses from slow or bad accounts and 
attracting and greatly increasing the volume of his cash 
trade" (Pltfs'. Ex. "A"). 
As the system operates, the licensee issues to the 
customer one stamp, as a token or symbol of a discount, 
for each ten cents paid in cash. These stamps are sup-
plied by The Sperry and Hutchinson Company and are 
pasted in books provided for that purpose by The Sperry 
and Hutchinson Company. Both the stamps and the 
books remain the property of the Company (Deft's. Ex. 
2). When the customer has accumulated 1200 of the 
stamps, or sooner at the customer's request, the Com-
pany redeems them either in merchandise or cash (R. 
175-176). 
To provide the stamps the retail merchant pays The 
Sperry and Hutchinson Company $15 a pad ( Pltfs '. Ex. 
"A"). They represent for the customer a discount of 
2.08% if redeemed in merchandise, or 1.66% if redeemed 
in cash (R. 176). 
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This system has been popularized in thirty-nine 
states (R. 174); and has been licensed in Utah since 
1914 (R. 179). At the time of the trial there were some 
30,000 licensees in the United States, of which 197 were 
in Utah and 11,397 in the eight western states of Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon 
and Washington (R. 180). 
The advantages which a retail merchant derives 
from operating on a cash basis are obvious: 
(a) He is spared the expense of extending credit to 
his customers: his capital is not tied up, neither does 
he have to pay interest on borrowed capital (R. 142-143; 
187); 
(b) He can save money on his own purchases by 
paying cash to his suppliers and enjoying the consequent 
discounts (R. 143) ; 
(c) He avoids losses on bad debts (R. 143; 187); 
. (d) He minimizes his bookkeeping expense and thus 
reduces his overhead (R. 187; 190); 
(e) He cuts his delivery cost because cash customers 
carry their own purchases ( R. 190) ; 
(f) Last but not least, of course, he attracts cus-
tomers who are willing to trade on a cash and carry basis 
in order to realize the consequent savings. 
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It does not follow, however, that because there are 
advantages to the merchant in operating on a cash basis, 
he is getting something for nothing: the discount that 
he allows is the cost to him of the advantage which he 
enjoys. Similarly, it cannot be said that the customer 
who receives the discount gets something for nothing: 
the loss of the use of his money sooner than would other-
wise be the case is the cost to him. In other words, a 
cash discount represents a quid pro quo; it is something 
for something, not something for nothing. 
In January 1947, Mr. Bush opened a cash and carry 
super market at 26th Street and Quincy Avenue in Ogden, 
Utah, where, in November 1950, he installed the S. & H. 
Co-operative Cash Discount System (R. 42). There-
after he issued to his customers one S. & H. cash dis-
count stamp for every ten cents paid in cash for any-
thing or everything in his store ( R. 42 ; 48 ; 53). The 
cost of providing these stamps, Mr. Bush treated as a 
non:-operating expense. The daily and monthly sales 
were recorded in his books at the prices actually paid by 
his customers (R. 143), and the stamps were included 
with other non-operating expenses which were sub-
sequently deducted from gross sales in order to arrive 
at net profit (R. 197). This was a proper and appropriate 
method from an accounting point of view (R. 203). Pend-
ing their use, the stamps were carried in a deferred 
account, for control purposes, in the same fashion that 
prepaid insurance is customarily carried (R. 197; 200). 
This, too, was perfectly proper (R. 203). 
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Not only did Mr. Bush recognize the advantages of 
operating his business on a cash basis (R. 142-143) but 
he considered the stamps as an advertising medium (R. 
51; 53; 159), a trade stimulant (R. 56; 140). His pur-
pose in using them was to attract additional business, not 
from any particular competitor but, generally, from any-
where he could get it (R. 53; 224), and, in his opinion, 
they did attract business to his store (R. 55; 223). 
In 1937, ten years before Mr. Bush went into the 
grocery business but many years after the S. & H. cash 
discount system had become established in Utah, the 
legislature of this state enacted an Unfair Practices Act 
(Title 16A, Chapter 4) to prohibit the sale of mer-
chandise at less than ''cost'' (as defined in the statute) 
with the intent or effect of injuring competitors and 
destroying competition. In lieu of actual cost, however, 
the statute permitted the retail merchant, if he wished, 
to take his invoice and freight, add to it an arbitrary 
markup of 6% for overhead, and thus arrive at what we 
shall refer to as ''statutory cost''. At the time when 
Mr. Bush became a licensee of The Sperry & Hutchinson 
Company, in November 1950, the practice had become 
established in the retail grocery business in Ogden of 
selling certain staple items, such as soap, coffee, flour, 
canned milk and other volume items (R. 84), at the fixed 
minimum markup of 6% (R. 47). About thirty-five per 
cent of the so-called "dry line" of groceries were 6% 
items (R. 131-132). In Mr. Bush's case, which was 
probably typical, something like twenty-five per cent of 
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the volume of sales were 6o/o items (R. 47; 57; 84) and, 
since his cash discount was storewide, ~1:r. Bush issued 
S. & H. cash discount stamps with these items, just as 
he did with all the rest (R. 53). 95% of the 6% items 
originated outside of the State of Utah (R. 132). 
Upon the theory that the effect of the stamps was 
to reduce the price of the 6o/o items below cost, the Trade 
Commission of Utah ordered Mr. Bush to cease and 
desist issuing stamps with such items (R. 1), and, when 
he refused, instituted the present action to compel him 
to desist. 
For an understanding of the nature of the con-
troversy, these, we believe, are all the facts that are 
required. There are others to which we shall presently 
refer in the belief that they may prove helpful in re-
solving the issues, and still others which, we think, 
merely color and becloud the issues. 
THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT 
The Unfair Practices Act (Title 16A, Chapter 4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943) was enacted in 1937 and 
provides, in part, as follows : 
"16A-4-7. Sales, less than cost.-(a) It shall 
be unlawful for any person * * * to sell * * * 
any article * * * at less than the cost thereof 
to such vendor * * * for the purpose of injuring 
competitors and destroying competition * * * or 
when the effect of selling * * * at less than cost 
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"" • * may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce ; and he * * * shall also be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be sub-
ject to the penalties [fine or imprisonment, or 
both] set out in section 15 of this act for any 
such act.'' 
"Cost defined: * * * 3. When used in this 
act, the term 'cost to the retailer' shall mean the 
invoice cost of the merchandise to the retailer 
within thirty days prior to the date of sale, or the 
date of offering for sale, or the replacement cost 
of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever is 
lower; less all trade discounts except customary 
discounts for cash; to which shall be added: (a) 
freight charges [if incurred] * * *, and (b) cart-
age [if incurred] * **,and (c) a markup to cover 
a proportionate part of the cost of doing business, 
which markup, in the absence of proof of a lesser 
cost, shall be six per cent of the cost to the re-
tailer as herein set forth after adding thereto 
freight charges and cartage * * * '' 
* * * * 
"16A-4-9. Transactions involving more than 
one item.-For the purpose of preventing evasion 
of the provisions of this act in all sales involving 
more than one item or commodity and in all sales 
involving the giving of any concession of any kind 
whatsoever (whether it be coupons or otherwise) 
the vendor's or distributor's selling price shall 
not be below the cost of all articles, products, com-
modities and concessions included in such trans-
actions.'' 
* • "" * 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
'' 16A-4-12. Sales exempt from act.-The pro-
visions of this act shall not apply to any sales 
made: 
(a) In closing out * • • stock • * *; 
(b) \Yhen the goods are damaged • • • ; 
(c) By an officer • • • of any court ; 
(d) In an endeavor made in good faith to meet 
the legal prices of a competitor as herein 
defined selling the same article, product or 
commodity in the same locality or trade 
area. • • •. '' 
• • • • 
"16A-4-17. Policy of Act.-The legislature 
declared that the purpose of this act is to safe-
guard the public against the creation or perpetua-
tion of monopolies and to foster and encourage 
competition, by prohibiting unfair and discrimina-
tory practices by which fair and honest competition 
is destroyed or prevented. This act shall be liber-
ally construed that its beneficial purposes may be 
sub served.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT !-Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie 
case because they did not prove that defendant sold 
any merchandise below cost, whether actual or statu-
tory, but only that defendant sold merchandise at 
statutory cost. We say this because the merchandise 
was marked up six per cent as required by the Act, 
and 
(a) The stamps, being an element of costs, would 
have to be included in any computation of a 
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markup to cover actual costs and should, for that 
reason, be covered by the statutory markup of 
six per cent which the statute permits in lieu 
of actual costs ; 
(b) The cost of providing stamps should be treated 
in the case of the cash and carry merchant as 
the cost of providing credit is treated in the 
case of the credit and delivery merchant: if the 
statutory markup of six per cent covers the 
one, it should cover the other; the markup is 
not selective ; and was not intended to be ap-
plied in a dis crimina tory manner; 
(c) The Act specifically provides (16A-4-9) that the 
retailer's cost shall be calculated on the basis of 
the total purchase, not on the basis of each item 
in the purchase; 
(d) The sale of six per cent items alone is such a 
rare event that if it should violate the statute 
to issue stamps on such an occasion, the law 
would not be concerned with such a trifle (de 
minimis non curat lex); 
POINT IT-Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie 
case because cash discounts, as distinguished from 
trade discounts, do not reduce prices. 
PoiNT III-Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie 
case because they did not prove that defendant made 
any sales ''for the purpose of injuring competitors 
and destroying competition.'' We say this because, 
(a) Defendant's intent was only to attract cash busi-
ness generally; to meet competition, not to in-
jure his competitors and destroy competition; 
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(b) Defendant cannot be held to have intended to 
incite price cuts or a price war, nor can he be 
held responsible for the acts of his competitors, 
legal or illegal ; and 
(c) Plaintiffs failed to carry the burden of proving 
that defendant issued S. & H. cash discount 
stamps for the purpose of injuring his com-
petitors and destroying competition. 
PoiNT IY-The Unfair Practices Act is unconstitutional 
because it violates the equal protective and due 
process clauses of the Federal Constitution and the 
corresponding sections (Article I, sees. 1 & 7) of 
the State Constitution. 
(a) The Act, if construed to cover all of the costs 
of the credit and delivery merchant but only 
some of the costs of the cash and carry mer-
chant, is unconstitutional. 
(b) If a cash discount is an element of price rather 
than cost, the Act is unconstitutional because it 
makes no allowance for the difference in the 
overhead of the cash and carry merchant as 
compared with the overhead of the credit and 
delivery merchant. 
(c) The Act, if construed only to prohibit the use 
of S. '& H. cash discount stamps is unconstitu-
tional because it discriminates against a legiti-
mate business. 
(d) The Act, if construed to permit conviction upon 
proof, in the alternative, of a wrongful intent or 
a harmful effect, is unconstitutional. 
(e) The Act is unconstitutional in any event because 
it is so vague and indefinite that the retail mer-
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chant is unable to ascertain when he is violating 
the law and, consequently, exposing himself to 
conviction of a misdemeanor and running the 
risk of a fine, imprisonment, and liability for 
civil damages. 
POINT V-The Retail Grocers Association which is the 
real party-plaintiff in this action has been guilty of 
price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and, 
accordingly, comes to Court with unclean hands, and 
for that reason should be denied injunctive relief, 
for the Unfair Practices Act does not, and could not, 
authorize price fixing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I -PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT 
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT SOLD ANY MER-
CHANDISE BELOW COST, WHETHER ACTUAL 
OR STATUTORY, BUT ONLY THAT DEFENDANT 
SOLD MERCHANDISE AT STATUTORY COST. 
Plaintiffs rest their case on the fact, to which de-
fendant stipulated, that Mr. Bush issued S. & H. cash 
discount stamps with merchandise sold at statutory cost 
(invoice or replacement cost, plus freight, plus cartage, 
plus six per cent). There was no charge and no evidence 
that he allowed any special discounts on these or any 
other items, for the fact is that he allowed the same dis-
count on everything in his store that was purchased for 
cash. Neither was there any charge that these items 
were "loss leaders". No attempt was made to show that 
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Mr. Bush received less than it cost him to acquire and 
handle the articles in question. 
The sole question for decision is whether it was legal 
for Mr. Bush to issue S. & H. cash discount stamps with 
merchandise marked up six per cent. The Trade Com-
mission contended and the Lower Court found that it 
was not legal (R. 21); we respectfully submit that it was 
perfectly legal. 
We shall consider this question first from the point 
of view of cost, for the emphasis in section 16A-4-7 with 
which we are concerned in this case is on C'Ost, rather 
than price: the charge is that Mr. Bush sold below cost, 
not that he cut prices. Like the California Unfair Prac-
tices Act, upon which it is modeled, the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act is not a price fixing statute. Food and 
Grocery Bureau v. United States, 139 F. 2d 937 (C. C. A. 
9th 1943). However, we shall also consider the question 
from the point of view of price, for that is the way 
the Commission seems to look at the case. 
In all that follows, we ask the Court to bear in mind 
that the statute is not only restrictive in a field which 
had been traditionally free, but that it carries criminal 
sanctions in the event of violation. Accordingly, unless 
the statute clearly indicates that certain conduct is illegal, 
it is manifest that no Court should incline tow;ards find-
ing it so as a matter of statutory construction. See: 
United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592; 
19 Ann. Cas. 68. 
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We also ask the Court to bear in mind that, ''to give 
a discount for cash payments is a long established mer-
cantile practice. The manufacturer allows such discount 
to the jobber and wholesaler, and the jobber and whole-
saler, to the retailer. To pass this on to the customer 
of the retailer is but providing a benefit to him who, in 
the last analysis, pays all the bills." (The Sperry and 
Hutchinson Company v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 465, 226 
P. 2d 501, 504 (1951) ). Under the Lower Court's inter-
pretation, the retailer can receive but he cannot allow 
cash discounts on 6% items and thus the ultimate con-
sumer "who, in the last analysis, pays all the bills" is 
deprived of a benefit which is available to everyone else 
in the chain of commerce. So far as we can see, this was 
never the intention of the Act and there is no legislative 
sanction for such an unfair and discriminatory result. 
The average family lives on a fixed or fairly fixed 
income. The housewife knows within predictable limits 
the amount of money available to her to purchase the 
family necessities: such things as clothing, drugs, food, 
and the many other items of every day consumption. 
Through the use of S. & H. stamps, it is possible to 
provide a discount on all of these things for the benefit 
of the careful housewife who makes her purchases in 
cash. If such cash discount stamps are now to be 
outlawed, this avenue of thrift will be closed to her. 
With these thoughts in mind, let us now consider 
whether the plaintiffs made out a prima facie case to 
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support their charge that defendant sold merchandise 
below cost in violation of the Act. 
(a) The stamps, being an element of costs, would 
have to be included in any computation of a 
markup to cover actual costs and should, for that 
reason, be covered by the statutory markup of 
six per cent which the statute permits in lieu 
of act~tal costs. 
It is quite undeniable that the stamps were an ele-
ment of Mr. Bush's cost of doing business. He con-
sidered them in the nature of advertising and his books 
showed that they were recorded as a financial expense 
(R.143-14±; 197). According to one of our most promi-
nent certified public accountants, Mr. Lincoln G. Kelley, 
this was an appropriate and customary way to record 
them (R. 189). 
Under the Act, Mr. Bush had a choice: he could sell 
his merchandise at actual cost or at statutory cost. His 
choice was free. It made no difference whether the 
actual cost was higher or lower than the statutory cost. 
He could take either one but he could not go below the 
lower of the two. The actual markup and the statutory 
markup were intended for the same purpose: to cover 
his cost of acquisition and ''a proportional part of the 
cost of doing business''. 
Now, it is apparent that, if Mr. Bush had elected 
to proceed on the basis of actual cost, he would have 
been compelled to count the S. & H. stamps as part of 
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his cost of doing business because, in fact, The Sperry 
and Hutchinson Company did not let him have them for 
nothing. That being so, it is equally apparent that if, 
instead, he elected to avail himself of the statutory mark-
up of 6%, the cost of supplying the S. & H. stamps would 
be covered by that markup, for that is exactly what the 
Act provides. It requires the merchant to add to his 
costs of acquisition ''a markup to cover a proportionate 
part of the cost of doing business.'' Stamps were a part 
of defendant's cost of doing business, and were therefore 
covered by the markup. The markup ''in the absence of 
proof of a lesser cost, shall be six percent". Mr. Bush 
marked up the items six percent and thereby satisfied 
the statutory requirements. 
Just as Mr. Bush would have had no right to exclude 
the stamps in computing his actual costs, the Commission 
had no authority, no logical reason, to exclude them from 
his statutory costs. 
To find that Mr. Bush did not meet the statutory 
requirements, one must read something into the Act which 
plainly is not there and was never intended to be there : 
viz., that the statutory markup is selective, that it covers 
everything but the stamps. Not only will one search the 
statute in vain for any inference or intimation which 
would justify such a course but it is apparent that such 
a course would do violence to the statute. The statutory 
scheme is to take either the actual cost of doing business 
or to pay no attention to actual cost and adopt an arbi-
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trary six percent in its place. The six percent bears no 
particular relationship to the actual cost of operating a 
retail grocery business nor to the cost of selling any 
particular items in that business (R. 195), nor, for 
that matter, to the cost of operating any other kind of 
retail business. Gasoline and groceries, for example, 
cannot be handled for the same cost. The statutory 
markup is not intended to be and in the nature of things 
could not possibly be anything but arbitrary. It is a 
legislative standard minimum, a blanket for all costs over 
and above invoice, freight and cartage. It is like the 
standard exemption that the taxpayer can elect to use 
instead of listing his actual deductions in the computation 
of his federal income tax. The statutory six percent, like 
the standard exemption, willy-nilly, covers everything, 
for that is the function it is intended to fulfill. To read 
into the statute an exception which would require the 
retail merchant to add the cost of his stamps to the six 
percent would be like requiring the taxpayer who makes 
use of the standard exemption to add to his taxable in-
come the amount that he contributes to the American Red 
Cross. It would combine with the arbitrary alternative, 
permitted by the act, one of the elements of the precise 
method of computing costs, and thus commingle and con-
fuse the two systems which are supposed to be quite 
separate and distinct. 
For the reason that the stamps would have to be 
included in any computation of actual costs, we respect-
fully submit that they were necessarily included in the 
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statutory costs and covered by the statutory markup on 
the items complained of. This, alone, we believe is a 
complete answer to the complaint. 
(b) The cost of providing stamps should be treated 
in the case of the cash and carry merc1hant as the 
cost. of providing credit is treated in the case of 
the credit and delivery merchant; if the statu-
tory markup of six percent covers the one it 
should cover the other; the markup is not selec-
tive, and was not intended t.o be applied itn .a 
discriminatory manner. 
The thought to which we now turn follows so closely 
upon the thought which we have just expressed that the 
Court has no doubt anticipated it and there is no need 
to labor the matter. The only difficulty is to find a way 
to state it without repetition. 
In an effort to attract business, not at the expense 
of any particular competitor but generally and with time 
honored indifference to the effect that it may have upon 
all of his competitors, a merchant may decide to extend 
credit and make deliveries. This, he has reason to be-
lieve, will attract the trade of people who are not so 
dollar conscious that they feel obliged to go to market 
early to avoid the crowd or to go at a more convenient 
hour and battle the crowd for the sake of a small 
savings. It will attract people who feel that they can 
afford the luxury of telephoning their orders and having 
the groceries delivered even though they have to pay a 
little more for them. 
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Now the fact is that it is not for the groceries that 
they pay more. Groceries are pretty standardized today 
both in price and in quality. It is for the extra service, 
the credit and the delivery, that the customer pays. That 
extra service costs the merchant money; he cannot give 
it for nothing. This is easily appreciated when one 
realizes that, 
(a) To extend credit, he must either pay interest on 
borrowed working capital, or, which is the same 
thing, lose the use of his own capital; 
(b) To extend credit, he must employ additional 
bookkeeping and clerical help, and incur postage 
and collection charges ; 
(c) By extending credit, he inevitably sustains 
losses on uncollectable accounts. 
All of these costs are covered by the statutory mark-
up. On that subject there can be no doubt and there is 
no dispute. 
On the other hand, a merchant like Mr. Bush, in an 
effort to attract business generally, may decide to allow 
a discount on all cash purchases. This, he believes, will 
attract the trade of people who are either willing or 
obliged to put up with some inconvenience to save a 
dollar. It will appeal, he thinks, to the thrifty as well 
as the needy. So confident is he that this is a good way 
to operate that he may decide to conduct all of his busi-
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ness on a cash and carry basis and to allow a storewide 
discount on all cash purchases. That is what Mr. Bush 
did. 
But this cash and carry merchant, too, has to pay 
something for the extra attraction. He has to pay the 
Sperry and Hutchinson Company to supply the stamps 
which enable him to make the discount available to his 
customers. 
Still a third merchant may combine the two types 
of business, operating partly, or even predominantly, for 
cash, and partly on credit. 
Now, each one of these merchants is in competition 
with the other and, when any one of them marks an 
item of staple merchandise down to the statutory mini-
mum of six percent, they all follow suit (R. 223) without 
regard to whether their operations are conducted on a 
cash basis, a credit basis, or both. In this way it has 
come about that a substantial part (R. 84) of the retail 
grocer's volume is in six percent merchandise. 
Can it be, we ask, that the statutory markup was 
intended to cover all of the costs of the credit and 
delivery merchant in this highly competitive segment of 
his business but only some of the costs of the cash and 
carry merchant? Can it be that the legislature intended 
to permit the credit and delivery merchant to sell staple 
items at 6% and require the cash and carry merchant to 
sell them at not less than 9o/o ? 
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If it did intend any such arbitrary and discrimina-
tory distinction, we doubt that any Court would hesitate 
to declare the statute unconstitutional. We prefer to 
think, however, that no such intention can be found in the 
Act; that the legislature intended the statutory markup 
to cover all the costs of a cash and carry merchant like 
~Ir. Bush, just as it intended it to cover all the costs of 
the credit and delivery merchants who compete with him. 
The discrimination, we believe, lies in the attempted en-
forcement, not in the statute itself. Where a Florida 
Board, in the administration of an unfair practices act 
was guilty of such discrimination the Court said, 
''There is a distinct difference between de-
livery and the cash and carry aspect of the laundry 
and dry cleaning business. The manner and cost 
of administration in each is materially different 
and those who prefer to patronize the cash and 
carry business are entitled to the advantage of 
this difference. In fixing a schedule of prices, it 
is the duty of the Board in the interest of the 
public to take into consideration these elements 
and establish a differential in charges between the 
two methods accordingly. If they fail in this, they 
may be required by the law as here quoted, to 
do so" (188 So. 380, 382). 
(Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board 
v. Everglades La.undry•, 137 Fla. 290, 188 
So. 380 [1939]). 
See also: Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 A. 2d 267 
(Md. 1951). 
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The argument that we now make may also be applied 
to other items of overhead such as the cost of advertising 
or the cost of providing free parking or delivery service. 
If one merchant attracts his customers through adver-
tisements or by providing free parking facilities and if 
the cost of these activities is covered by the statutory 
markup, why should not another merchant attract cus-
tomers through the use of S. & H. cash discount stamps, 
and, if he does, why should not the cost of the stamps 
be covered by the statutory markup~ The comparison 
is a little less apparent than the comparison of the cost 
of providing a cash discount on the one hand, and bor-
rowing capital to extend credit, on the other, but it is still 
a valid comparison, and the statutory markup is just as 
applicable. There is nothing selective about the statu-
tory markup. If the cost is real, and not feigned, the 
markup covers it. 
This argument finds strong support in Bristol-
Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843 
(1939), where the court, holding that trading stamps did 
not have the effect of cutting fair trade prices, said, 
'' ... If, for example, merchant A provides 
orchestral music for his customers at a certain 
hour of the day, or maintains in his store a salon 
where works of art are exhibited, or a nursery 
where children are fed and otherwise cared for 
while their mothers are shopping in the store, or 
if he provides his customers free bus service to and 
from his store, merchant B has no grounds for 
complaint which the law will heed. Yet all these 
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things confer benefits on the customer and some 
of these benefits are susceptible of pecuniary meas-
urement. It follows, therefore, that for a merchant 
to confer pecuniary benefits upon his customers, 
which benefits son1e con1peting merchant does not 
confer, does not amount to such unfair competition 
as the Fair Trade Act forbids. Merchant A can 
extend his customers 30 or 60 days credit on the 
purchase of a comn1odity while merchant B refuses 
to extend any credit on the purchase of the same 
article. A is not thereby violating the Fair Trade 
Act. A may allow a discount of 1% on all bills 
paid within ten days after being rendered. B may 
allow no such discount. A is not thereby violating 
the Fair Trade Act'' ( 6 A. 2d 843, 84 7). 
See also lVeco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug 
Stores (Garfield), 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P. 2d 856 
(1943). 
Since the statutory markup unquestionably covers 
all of the costs of the credit and delivery merchant, we 
respectfully submit that it should cover all of the costs 
of the cash and carry merchant, including the cost of his 
cash discount stamps. This, we believe, furnishes a sec-
ond, complete answer to the complaint. 
(c) The .Act specifically provides that the retailer's 
cost shall be calculated on the basis of the total 
purchase, not on the basis of each item in the 
purchase. 
Knowing just what was required as evidence to sup-
port the Trade Commission's complaint, assuming the 
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validity of its interpretation of the Act, Mr. Hale, the 
Executive Secretary of the Commission, went into Mr. 
Bush's store and bought nothing but 6% items. Such a 
purchase, in normal course, would be very rare (R. 221-
222), perhaps no more frequent than one in a thousand 
(R. 141-142). It may therefore be appropriate to con-
sider what the rule should be when the purchase follows 
the normal pattern and consists of mixed items: 6% and 
others marked up perhaps as high as 30% (R. 153), the 
average being at least 13% (R. 158; 195). 
The Commission did not, we think, intend to conduct 
a meaningless test of the legality of Mr. Bush's sales 
policy, a test which would apply only to one purchase in 
a thousand. On the contrary, we believe that the Com-
mission interpreted the Act to require Mr. Bush to re-
frain from issuing stamps with 6% merchandise even 
though the merchandise was commingled with other mer-
chandise which brought the average markup above 6%, 
and intended to test that interpretation by this action. 
It intended to enforce a fiat prohibition on the issuance 
of cash discount stamps with 6% items. It interpreted 
the Act to require a minimum markup of 9% on each 
item sold with stamps. Unless we are correct in this, the 
present litigation is much ado about nothing, for, as we 
have shown, it is a rare sale that relates to 6% items 
alone, and the average markup in the retail grocery busi-
ness is at least 13% (R. 158; 195). 
If we correctly comprehend the Commission's posi-
tion, we beg leave, again, to differ with it. Even assum-
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ing, arguendo, that the stamps must be offset by some 
reciprocal markup, we find nothing in the Act to require 
an allocation of that markup to each individual item, as 
distinguished from the average markup of the purchase 
as a whole. Quite to the contrary, section 16A-4-9, which 
relates to "Transactions i'YI!Volving mor,e tharn one item," 
clearly provides that, if stamps are considered to be some 
sort of concession, as the Commission contends, the 
average rather than the individual markup should con-
trol. In very express language, this section of the Act 
provides that, 
''in all sales involving more than one item or com-
modity and in all sales involving the giving of 
any concession of any kind whatsoever (whether 
it be coupons or otherwise) the vendor's or dis-
tributor's selling price shall not be below the cost 
of all articles, products, commodities and conces-
sions included in such transactions." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
We find difficulty in paraphrasing the statute to 
make it any more readily understood. If stamps are a 
concession, as the Commission contends, and if the aver-
age markup in the retail grocery business is at least 13%, 
there is more than enough leeway in the markup to cover 
the cost of the alleged concession: the statutory cost of 
the items being only 6%, there is 7% left over to meet the 
cost of the alleged concession. 
In State of Wisconsin v. Tanker ,Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 
218, 26 N.W. 2d 647, 649 (1947), the State of Wisconsin 
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brought proceedings against a gasoline dealer who ad-
vertised that two gallons of gasoline would be given away 
free (except for sales tax) with each seven gallons of 
gasoline purchased. There, as here, the statute forbade 
sales below cost and there, as we believe here, the State 
took the position that the cost of each item had to be 
separately considered. Per contra, the defendant claimed 
that the nine gallons should be treated as a whole for 
cost purposes, just as we contend that the full market 
basket should be treated as a whole. The Court sus-
tained defendant's position, stating: 
"The legislature sought by the Unfair Sales 
Act to prevent transactions in which, considered 
as a whole, there was a sale of goods at less than 
cost for the purposes of attracting business.'' 
(Emphasis ours.) 
We admit that the point we have just made goes 
beyond the record of the present case, for Mr. Hale 
restricted his purchases to 6% items and refrained from 
making the only kind of purchase (one of mixed items) 
that would have provided the basis for a really mean-
ingful test of the law but we have not restricted our 
argument lest this whole proceeding boil down to nothing. 
If, as we believe, it is the Commission's view that 
the ''cost'' of each item in a purchase must be separately 
computed when stamps are included, we respectfully 
submit that we have demonstrated the contrary. At 
the very least, if each item is marked up the statutory 
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minimum of six percent, and the average markup in the 
retail grocery business is 13%, Chapter 16A-4-9 indi-
cates that it is no crime to include cash discount stamps 
having a redemption value in merchandise of 2.08%. 
This, of course, would validate all but one out of a thou-
sand sales in Mr. Bush's store. 
(d) The sale of 6o/o items alone is such a rare event 
that, if it should violate the statute to issue 
stamps on such an occasion, the law would not 
be concerned with such a trifle (de minimis non 
curat lex). 
If the ''cost of all articles, products, commodities and 
concessions", as the Act clearly provides, is the criterion 
by which the legality of Mr. Bush's sales is to be judged, 
rather than the cost of each individual component, it will 
only be a very rare sale, perhaps one in a thousand, 
when the Act would be violated by the issuance of stamps 
even if the Court were to adopt the theory, which seems 
so completely untenable to us, that the statutory markup 
does not include the cost of providing stamps. 
The law does not concern itself with such trifles (de 
minimis non curat lex), and rightly so, for, on the one 
hand, it is a practical impossibility from a management 
point of view to train checkers to control such a situation 
(R. 154), and, on the other hand, such a very occasional 
and minor infraction of a statute which is aimed at 
practices deemed to have a deleterious effect upon the 
economic welfare of the community cannot have been 
within the contemplation of the legislature. 
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The maxim of de minimis non curat lex was applied 
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Bristol-Meyers 
v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843 (1939), when it held 
that the issuance of trading stamps worth 1.76% with 
each purchase did not cut prices in violation of the 
Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act. In this connection, the 
Court said, 
''There is also a time-honored maxim of the 
law which applies to this case, to wit: 'De minimis 
non curat lex'. 
* * * * 
''If, for example, a customer spent $99 in Lit 
Brothers' store for the purchase of 396 tubes of 
'Ipana Tooth Paste' (a supply adequate for a 
long lifetime) and upon the presentation to the 
Stamp Company of the 990 trading stamps he re-
ceived an article worth $1.75, he would be obtaining 
in the form of merchandise a discount of 1.76%. 
Applying this to each 25 cent purchase of tooth 
paste, it would amount to four and 4/lOths mills 
on that purchase. When the further facts are con-
sidered that this 'discount' is not in cash and that 
fewer than 12/srds of the purchasers of commodities 
at Lit Brothers' store ask for or accept trading 
stamps, the infraction charged appears to be still 
more trifling than above indicated'' ( 6 A. 2d 843, 
848). 
The infraction of which Mr. Bush might be guilty 
if, in one case out of a thousand, the issuance of cash 
discount stamps should violate the statute is, we submit 
still more trifling. Furthermore, society would not be 
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well served by convicting a merchant of a misdemeanor 
because, in one case out of a thousand, his checkers 
charged a fraction of a cent below cost on a pound of 
coffee or a quart of salad dressing. 
POINT II-PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE BECAUSE CASH DIS-
COUNTS, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM TRADE 
DISCOUNTS, DO NOT REDUCE PRICES. 
Cash discount stamps are either an element of cost 
or an element of price but not of both. No one suggests 
that stamps are, at one and the same time, elements of 
cost and price. Since our opponents cannot admit that 
stamps are an element of cost and, in the same breath, 
deny that they are covered by the statutory markup, they 
are driven to contend that stamps are not an element of 
cost at all but only of price. Baldly stated, they take the 
position that all that Mr. Bush did was to mark his mer-
chandise up 6% and then mark it right down again, 
either 1.66% or 2.08%, depending upon whether the pur-
chaser eventually redeemed his stamps in cash or mer-
chandise. 
The first answer to this facile argument is that the 
element of costs cannot be avoided by simply ignoring it, 
and neither can the fact that the statute made cost, 
rather than price, the index to legality. The argument 
not only fails to meet the real point at issue but it pro-
ceeds upon the wrong ground. We are not dealing here 
with a price fixing statute. Food and Grocery Bureau 
v. United States, 139 F. 2d 937 (C.C.A. 9th 1943). 
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The second answer is that Mr. Bush did not in fact, 
mark his merchandise down. He markea it up 6%, as 
required by the statute, and it stayed there. He collected 
the full markup in cash. The customer paid the same 
whether he took stamps or not (R. 215-216). The price 
remained unchanged. 
But the Commission will argue that the stamps were 
the equivalent of a discount and that a discount is the 
equivalent of a price cut. This, it will be observed, 
raises two questions : first, whether the stamps are the 
equivalent of a discount, and, second, if they are, 
whether a discount is the equivalent of a price cut. 
The first question need not be argued, for the liti-
gants are in agreement that cash discount stamps are 
equivalent to a cash discount. The Sperry and Hutchin-
son Company contract makes this very plain (Pltf's Ex. 
"A") ; the witnesses, Schirer and Kelley, so testified 
(R. 173-174; 187-188); the Lower Court so found (Find-
ing of Fact No. 6; R. 21); and there is a long line of 
authority 'to sustain the finding. Thus, in State v. Holt-
greve, 58 Utah 563, 571 200 Pac. 894, 897 (1921), a case 
involving S. & H. cash discount stamps, the Court said: 
'' * * * Stamps were issued merely as a con-
venient means of allowing or granting a discount 
to the merchant's customers on small as well as 
on large purchases which were paid for in cash and 
to identify the purchasers entitled to such a 
discount.'' 
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So, also, in Food and Grocery Bureatt, Inc. v. Gar-
field. 20 Cal. 2d 228, 232, 125 P. 2d 3, 6 (1942) the Court 
said, 
''It is well settled by the decisions of this 
court, as well as those in other jurisdictions, that 
the practices of merchants in issuing trading 
stamps with the purchases of articles is merely a 
method of discounting bills in consideration for 
the immediate payment of cash." (Citing cases 
from eight jurisdictions.) 
See also The Sperry and Hutchinson Company v. Hudson, 
190 Ore. 458, 465, 226 P. 2d 501, 504 ( 1951). 
1\Iany other authorities to the same effect could be 
cited but the point is not in dispute. 
The second question, whether a discount is equivalent 
to a price cut, requires more time-consuming analysis, 
for some discounts do and others do not have the effect 
of cutting prices. The Lower Court found that the dis-
count with which we are here concerned did have such 
an effect (Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 21). With great 
respect for the Lower Court, we beg to differ. It seems 
quite clear to us that a contrary finding should have been 
made, for we are dealing here with a cash discount rather 
than a trade discount. 
Trade discounts are a convenient means for adjust-
ing prices. The purpose of a trade discount is to accom-
modate list prices to actual selling prices which are 
determined by quantity, competitive factors and other 
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considerations subject to change from time to time, but 
without regard to terms of payment (R. 186). A quantity 
discount is one of the most common forms. 
Cash discounts, on the other hand, regulate the terms 
of payment. Their purpose is to induce the customer to 
make payment promptly so as to relieve the seller of the 
necessity of borrowing working capital, to spare him the 
expense of keeping books, to obviate losses on bad debts, 
etc., as we have indicated on page 4, supra, and as the 
record shows (R. 187). 
If an article is priced at $1, less 2% for cash, the 
customer who pays cash pays 98¢ net, the customer who 
charges pays $1, and the customer whose account be-
comes overdue may eventually pay $1.02, but the price 
remains the same in each case, viz. one dollar. The only 
difference is that the customer who pays early is re-
warded because of the savings that his promptness has 
effected for the seller, and the customer who pays late is 
made to bear the loss occasioned by his delay. One pays 
less, and one pays more; but the price remains in each 
case the same. The difference is required by capital con-
siderations, not by any revision of the price. The price 
is fixed and determined by the seller at the outset but the 
amount of money paid is determined, within the limits 
of the discount, by the buyer. It would seem quite il-
logical, we think, to hold that price is a fluctuating thing 
that depends upon the time within which payment is 
made. 
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This distinction between trade discounts and cash 
discounts is succinctly stated by Rosenkampff and Wider 
in the "Theory of Accounts", 1942, at pages 478 and 488 
as follows: 
''Trade Discount on Sales. Many concerns 
allow trade discounts on shipments made to cus-
tomers. The reason for this procedure is that 
prices in published catalogs are purposely estab-
lished at high amounts in order that fluctuations 
in prices may be measured from the list or catalog 
prices by means of the trade discount, thereby 
obviating the necessity of publishing new catalogs. 
A trade discount is also used as a device to give 
certain customers preference over others'' (p. 
478). 
''Cash Discount on Sales.-Strictly speaking, 
a cash discount is a financial inducement to the 
customer to pay bills on or before a date specified 
in the sales invoice. A 1% or 2% discount, if 
the bill is paid in 10 days, is a typical induce-
ment. Consequently, it should be treated as a non-
operating item, rather than as a deduction from 
the sales price" (p. 488). 
The same distinction is recognized, for example, by 
the United States Office of Contract Settlement (Termi-
nation cost memorandum 15-J ournal of Accountancy, 
V. 80, Sept. 1945, pp. 237-8) as follows: 
"The term 'cash discount on purchases', as 
used herein, refers to a reduction in the amount 
paid to a vendor for the purchase of any items 
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included in a termination settlement, solely by 
reason of the payment therefor within a specified 
period. It should be differentiated from trade dis-
counts, rebates, and other allowances, which are 
usually treated as a direct deduction from the pur-
chase price of the items to which they relate." 
Finally, this distinction between trade discounts and 
cash discounts appears in the statute now under con-
sideration, for, in defining "cost", the legislature spe-
cifically excluded trade discounts and included cash dis-
counts, as follows : 
''Cost de fined: * • * 3. When used in this 
act, the term 'cost to the retailer' shall mean the 
invoice cost of the merchandise to the retailer 
* * * less all trade discounts 1except customary 
discounts for cash; * * * '' (emphasis ours). 
The legislative intent here is perfectly clear: In 
determining his basic or actual cost, the statut.e requires 
the retailer to deduct trade discounts, which represent a 
reduction from list or catalogue price and, consequently, 
are not true elements of cost, but forbids him to deduct 
cash discounts, which merely compensate him for making 
payment in cash, and, consequently, are true elements 
of cost. Translating this into terms of price, for that 
is the subject now under consideration, we believe that 
"invoice cost" can be read as "list price" and that the 
legislature intended to establish, as the first basic ele-
ment, the actual price paid by the retailer for the mer-
chandise. It recognized that trade discounts reduce price 
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but that cash discounts relate only to the terms of pay-
ment. Accordingly, in the computation of price it elimi-
nated the former as an element but retained the latter; 
it adjusted the list price on the one hand and compen-
sated for the cash discounts on the other so as to arrive 
at the actual price of the merchandise. 
In doing this, we submit that the legislature not only 
indicated that it was well aware of the distinction be-
tween trade discounts and cash discounts but that it 
established, as a matter of legislative policy, that cash 
discounts were not to be considered to reduce prices. In 
the light of this legislative policy, it is difficult to see 
why a cash discount should be treated one way in the 
case of a purchase at wholesale and in quite the opposite 
way in the case of a purchase at retail. 
Granted that ''the life of the law has not been 
logic", how can it be said that cash discounts do not 
affect wholesale prices but do affect retail prices~ The 
purpose of the discount is the same in each case. The 
result is the same in each case. Surely if the retailer 
is forbidden to deduct cash discounts in determining the 
price at which he buys his merchandise, he cannot be 
compelled to deduct cash discounts in determining the 
price at which he sells his merchandise. If he is obliged 
to consider his purchase price $1.00, rather than 98¢, 
even though he has received a discount of 2% for cash, 
surely he should not be obliged to consider his selling 
price 98¢, rather than $1.00, when he allows a discount 
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of 2% for cash. Yet, this is the way in which our op-
ponents and the Lower Court have interpreted the 
statute. 
If the stamps were nothing more than gifts, they 
would, of course, fall into the category of a trade dis-
count and constitute a price cut, but, as we have re-
peatedly indicated, they are not gifts: they are not some-
thing for nothing. The law on this point has been settled 
by Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Oar field, 20 Cal. 2d 
228; 125 P. 2d 3 ( 1942) and confirmed by Weco Products 
Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores (Garfield), 55 Cal. 
App. 2d 684; 131 P. 2d 856 (1943). Both of these cases 
attacked the practice of Mr. Garfield, a retail merchant, 
in issuing trading stamps to his cash customers at the 
rate of one stamp for each 10¢ purchase. These were 
his own stamps and he redeemed them himself either in 
cash or merchandise, but the system was the same, in 
substance, as The Sperry and Hutchi11:son Cooperative 
Cash Discount System which is the subject of the present 
suit. The redemption value in Mr. Garfield's case 
was 2% in cash or 2.5% in merchandise. In the first 
case, which was prosecuted under the California Unfair 
Practices Act, the plaintiff contended that Garfield's 
stamps were gifts. The Court rejected this contention, 
saying: 
"It must be concluded, therefore, that the 
trading stamp plan adopted by the appellant does 
not constitute the making of a gift of $1 in cash 
or $1.25 in merchandise but is a discount given 
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the customer in consideration of his paying cash.'' 
(125 P. 2d 3, 7.) 
In the second case, which was prosecuted under the 
California Fair Trade Act, the plaintiff contended that 
Garfield's stamps had the effect of cutting prices on fair 
trade articles. The Court rejected this contention, also, 
saying: 
"Are they [trading stamps] to be regarded 
as a discount for cash, as a means of advertising, 
a device to entice customers and to retain their 
trade, or do they simply represent a cut in the sale 
price of the articles with which they are given? 
If the latter, they accomplish a cut in the estab-
lished price of merchandise; and where such mer-
chandise is sold at minimum Fair Trade Act prices, 
the giving of trading stamps then amounts to a 
sale below such prices. 
"If, however, the stamps are given by the mer-
chant in the nature of an inducement to customers 
to attract them to his store, the practice is in the 
nature of an advertising device, and is no more 
to be condemned as violative of the Fair Trade 
Act than would be such commonly employed de-
vices as free parking room, care of infants and 
other plans offered by some mercantile establish-
ments in competition with their rivals. Free 
parking for automobiles of customers might be 
said to result in a lesser price paid by a customer 
for goods purchased, yet it could hardly be reason-
ably contended that thereby a violation of the Fair 
Trade Act had been worked. 
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"Neither can it be asserted that by giving 
discounts for cash the terms of the statute in ques-
tion are contravened. A cash discount is a re-
ward for prompt payment. It is a trade practice 
long established, and is authoritatively recognized 
as being not a deduction from the purchase price. 
Montgomery Auditing Theory and Practice (pp. 
499-500). 
"Consideration of such authorities as are 
available leads us to the conclusion that the giving 
of trading stamps as in the instance now before 
us does not effect a reduction in the price of the 
articles sold such as to constitute a violation of 
the Fair Trade Act * * * '' 
* * * * 
"It is true that the Food and Grocery Bureau 
case involved a different statute, the Unfair Prac-
tices Act rather than the Fair Trade Act, but the 
ruling of the Court must be regarded as conclusive 
of the status of the trading stamp in commercial 
retail business'' ( 131 P. 2d 856, 858). 
''To denominate appellant's trading stamp 
plan as a device for giving a cash discount on mer-
chandise, rather than as a cut in price upon the 
article sold, gains force when we consider that 
the stamps are given uniformly and without regard 
to the type of goods sold or the purchaser of the 
same. The only condition is that cash be paid for 
the purchases'' ( 131 P. 2d 856, 859). 
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Here, therefore, in companion cases we find the an-
swers to both of the questions which control the present 
controversy, if it is viewed from the price point of view. 
In the first case the use of trading stamps was held to be 
equivalent to a cash discount; and in the second case it 
was held that such a cash discount did not have the effect 
of cutting prices. 
Here, also, we find the origin of the present contro-
versy and come, right to the heart of the matter, for it 
was the Attorney General's reliance on the first of these 
two cases and his disregard of the second that precipi-
tated the present dispute. Apparently asked, generally, 
whether trading stamps violated the Fair Trade Act or 
the Unfair Practices Act, he replied to Mr. Hale, Execu-
tive-Secretary of the Trade Commission, on May 21, 1951, 
that, in his opinion, they did, if they had the effect of 
reducing the prices, in the one case below the ''minimum 
resale price'' and in the other case below ''cost'' as de-
fined by the Act. As authority for this, he cited the 
Food and Grocery case, saying that the only reasonable 
inference which could be drawn from the court's decision 
was that if the redeemable value of the trading stamps 
had reduced the price of the merchandise below cost, it 
would have constituted a violation of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act ( Opitnion of the Attorney Oeneral, May 21, 
1951). Unfortunately, he overlooked the Weco Prod-
ucts case which held that cash discount stamps, despite 
their redeemable value, do not have the effect of reduc-
ing price. 
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The Attorney General did not say that stamps cut 
prices but that is what Mr. Hale understood him to say 
and that is the assumption upon which the Trade Com-
mission based the prosecution of this enforcement pro-
ceeding. Taking its cue directly from the Attorney 
General's conclusion that "if the redeemable value of 
the trading stamps reduces the price ... below cost", 
they violate the Unfair Practices Act, the Trade Com-
mission issued a cease and desist order on May 28, 1951, 
(one week after the Attorney General's opinion), which 
recited that '' S. & H. Green Stamps with their redeem-
able value did reduce the sale price of the commodities 
below cost", and called upon Mr. Bush to refrain from 
issuing them. 
It is difficult to comprehend how the Attorney Gen-
eral could have misunderstood the Food and Grocery 
decision or how he could have overlooked the Weco Prod-
ucts decision, but it is easy to understand how Mr. Hale, 
misinformed of the significance of the first case and 
uninformed of the existence of the latter, proceeded upon 
a false assumption. 
The Attorney General of Oklahoma under similar 
circumstances, after reviewing the Food and Grocery 
decision and the Weco Products decision said, in an opin-
ion dated May 8, 1950, of which we shall be pleased to 
provide copies to the Court : 
'' * * • The weight of law, logic and reason, 
as declared by decisions of the various courts, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
holds clearly and distinctly to the view that the 
practice of giving trading stamps • • • does not 
amount to nor will it sustain a charge of, price 
cutting.'' 
The Attorney General of Oklahoma also discussed at 
length B ristol-lll eyers Co. v. Lit. Bros., supra, wherein the 
Court said, 
"It is clear to us that the practice indulged 
in by Lit Brothers, of issuing trading stamps with 
the sales of its merchandise falls within the sphere 
of legitimate competition and does not constitute 
a 'selling [of] any commodity at less than the 
price stipulated' and that it is not 'unfair compe-
tition' within the meaning of the act appellant 
invokes. To come within the prohibitions of the 
act, Lit Brothers would have to either (1) cut 
directly the price of the commodities within the 
act's protection, or (2) accomplish the same result 
in respect to the commodities by a device which 
was a palpable subterfuge resorted to for the 
purpose of circumventing the law" (6 A. 2d 843, 
847-8). 
Upon reason, authority, and as a matter of statutory 
construction, we respectfully submit that the Lower 
Court was in error in finding that the stamps which Mr. 
Bush issued to his cash customers had the effect of cut-
ting prices; that, on the contrary, they had no such effect; 
and, finally, that the authority upon which the Attorney 
General relied and upon which the Trade Commission 
acted stood for no such proposition. 
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POINT III -PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT 
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT MADE ANY SALES 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INJURING COMPETI-
TORS AND DESTROYING COMPETITION. 
We come now- to the question of wrongful intent. 
If an act, such as the sale of milk below a definitely 
fixed price, is prohibited by the State in the exercise of 
its police power, one can be convicted of a violation if, 
in fact, he sells below the fixed price, no matter how good 
his intentions may have been and no matter how innocent 
his purpose (N ebbia v. New York, 291 U. S., 502, 78 L. Ed. 
940 [1934] ). But, if an act, such as the sale of mer-
chandise below cost is prohibited and the definition of 
''cost'' is uncertain, one cannot be convicted of a viola-
tion just because he sells below cost but only if he does 
so with wrongful intent; that is to say, for the purpose 
of injuring his competitors and destroying competition. 
The reason for this distinction between a statute 
prohibiting the sale of a certain commodity below a fixed 
price and a statute prohibiting the sale of merchandise in 
general below cost is that, in the one case, a man can 
easily tell when he is violating the law, for there is no 
uncertainty about it, but in the other case, it is difficult for 
him to know when he is and when he is not violating the 
law, for there is a great deal of uncertainty about it. 
Accordingly, in the case of the anti-price discrimina-
tion and unfair practice acts the law has become well 
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settled that there must not only be an act, a sale at a dis-
criminatory price or below cost, but there must also be 
a wrongful intent. The underlying reason for this, to 
repeat, is that, under broad regulatory statutes of this 
kind, it is so difficult for a merchant to know whether he 
is transgressing some regulation with which the legis-
lature has seen fit to guide him, that it is unfair to con-
vict him on the basis of an innocent or unwitting and 
unintended misinterpretation of the law. (Daniel Lough-
ran Co., Inc. v. Lord B.altimore etc. Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A. 
2d 201 [1941] ). The present case perfectly illustrates 
the wisdom of the rule. 
As the Court said in Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 
585, 208 P. 2d 538 ( 1949), after referring to many earlier 
decisions from other states construing unfair practices 
acts, 
"From all of the cases cited it appears that 
wherever the statute contained the words 'with 
intent or effect' or 'with the intent, effect, or 
result,' etc., and the constitutionality of the Act 
was challenged on that ground or on that ground 
with others, such Act is generally held to be un-
constitutional" (208 P. 2d 538, 544). 
For an interesting discussion of this point, see 
Thatcher: "The Constitutionality of the Unfiair-Prac-
tices Acts", 25 Oregon Law Review, 250-255. See also 
Commonwealth v. Zaslo If, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67 
(1940); St.ate v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P. 
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2d 650 (1941); State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 
335, 181 N.W. 607 (1938). 
In the case at bar the Act under consideration per-
mitted, in the alternative, proof either of a wrongful in-
tent or a harmful effect, for it made it unlawful to sell 
below cost "for the purpose of injuring competitors and 
destroying competition* * *or when the effect of selling 
at less than cost * * * may be substantially to lessen 
competition * * *." Similarly, in its complaint, the 
Trade Commission alleged, in the alternative, that the 
sales complained of were made either "for the purpose 
of injuring competitors or the effect thereof was and will 
be to substantially lessen competition". 
Recognizing, however, that it would not be enough 
under the Unfair Practices Act to prove, in the alterna-
tive, a wrongful intent or a harmful effect, counsel for 
the plaintiffs conceded at the trial that ''an essential 
element of proof that we must bear here is that these 
sales * * *were made with the intent to injure competi-
tors" (R. 68). 
This also was the position taken by the Trial Court 
which said, 
''Under our statute the selling of merchandise 
below the legal price must be coupled with the in-
tent to injure competition within the same trade 
area to constitute conduct on the part of the mer-
chant which is unlawful and subjects said merchant 
to an injunction" (Memo Decision, R. 16). 
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Both on reason and authority therefore, it is plain 
that in addition to sales below cost, it was incumbent 
upon plaintiffs to show as part of their prima facie case 
that such sales were made by the defendant ''for the pur-
pose of injuring competitors and destroying competi-
tion.'' The Trial Court found that the plaintiffs had 
sustained this burden (Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 22). 
We respectfully submit that there is no evidence to sup-
port such a finding. 
(a) Defendant's intent was only to attract busimess 
generally: to meet competition, not to injure his 
competitors and destroy competition. 
No claim is made in this case that there is anything 
reprehensible about the use of S. & H. cash discount 
stamps. As the Court said in Ex parte Hutchinson, 137 
Fed. 949 ( 1904), 
''The giving of trading stamps is merely one 
way of discounting bills in consideration of 
immediate payment of cash which is a common 
practice of merchants and is doubtless a popular 
method and advantageous to all concerned and it 
is not obnoxious to public policy" (p. 949). 
Speaking of S. & H. stamps, the Court in Winston v. 
Beeson, 135 N. C. 271, 283, 47 S. E. 457, 461 (1904) said: 
''The plan as outlined in the verdict seems to 
be one for advertising the merchant's business and 
his wares and enabling him to sell his goods for 
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cash instead of on time. This, it must be conceded 
is an advantage to him. It is also a benefit to the 
customer who practically receives a discount and 
who will buy more cautiously and judiciously if he 
pays cash and will spend only according to his 
means.'' 
Similarly, no claim is made in this case that it was 
reprehensible or illegal for Mr. Bush to install the S. & H. 
Co-operative Cash Discount System in his store so as to 
secure to himself and his customers the benefits available 
under that system. 
In the conduct of his business, Mr. Bush had certain 
competitive handicaps: he did not extend credit, take 
telephone orders, make deliveries or provide free park-
ing. To meet these competitive practices he simply in-
stalled a storewide cash discount. His intent was the 
same when he issued S. & H. stamps on merchandise 
marked up 16% as it was when he issued them on mer-
chandise marked up only 6% (R. 53): namely, to allow 
a cash discount on everything for the purpose of stimu-
lating his trade, advertising his business, and meeting his 
competition. 
To charge that Mr. Bush had some sinister purpose 
in issuing cash discount stamps on 6% items, that he 
issued such stamps on such items, as contrasted with 
others at higher markups, ''for the purpose of injuring 
competitors and destroying competition'' is ludicrous. 
If there was any violation of the Act, which we deny, it 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
could only have been incidental, not purposeful. It sim-
ply makes no sense at all to contend that Mr. Bush in ... 
tended to injure his competitors and destroy competition 
when he issued cash discount stamps with a quart of salad 
dressing marked up 6% but that he had no such intent 
when he issued them with a can of beans marked up 
8.08%. The storewide application of the discount negates 
any supposed intention to sell particular items below 
statutory cost. 
Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. 2d 839, atf'd, 11 Cal. App. 2d 
663, 82 P. 2d 19 (1938), was a suit brought to enjoin a 
retail grocer from selling certain staple merchandise, 
such as Kellogg's Corn Flakes, slightly below cost in 
violation of the California Unfair Competition Act which 
prohibited such sales when made for the purpose of 
injuring competitors and destroying competition. There 
was no question about the sales having been made below 
cost, for defendant admitted it, but he denied that he 
made such sales for the purpose of injuring competitors 
and destroying competition. Upon a finding that the 
sales were made "with the sole purpose of advertising 
his business, improving his trade, and stimulating inter-
est on the part of customers in those products and in his 
business, and not with the intention of injuring competi-
tors or destroying competition'', the Court denied the 
injun<{tion and dismissed the action. Affirming the 
judgment on appeal, the Court said, 
"Plaintiff failed to prove a cause of action 
against him. It was a necessary element of the 
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illegal selling of goods for less than cost, as the 
statute existed when this case was tried, that the 
act be performed with the purpose of injuring 
competitors and destroying competition. The bur-
den was on the plaintiff to establish that unlawful 
purpose. The record in this case is devoid of any 
such evidence. The court specifically found that 
the respondent did not sell the goods below cost 
with that purpose in view. On the contrary, the 
court found that he sold the goods below cost for 
the sole purpose of advertising his grocery busi-
ness and to stimulate trade" (74 P. 2d 839, 843). 
Notwithstanding that the Lower Court in the case 
at bar found that Mr. Bush did intend to injure com-
petitors and destroy competition, the testimony showed 
that Mr. Bush's only intent was to advertise his grocery 
business and to stimulate trade. He so testified re-
peatedly, and neither the facts nor the circumstances 
contradicted him. See also Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal. 
App. 2d 254, 210 P. 2d 314 (1949); State v. 20th Century 
Market, 236 Wis. 215, 294 N.W. 873 (1940). 
There was, we submit, no proof that Mr. Bush in-
tended to injure his competitors or destroy competition 
but only that he employed a perfectly legitimate method, 
a cash discount, to meet the equally legitimate competi-
tive practices of the credit and delivery type of merchant 
engaged in the same business. 
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(b) Defendant cannot be held to have intended to 
incite price cuts or a price war, nor can he be 
held responsible for the acts of his competitors, 
legal or illegal. 
In lieu of any proof of a wrongful intent on Mr. 
Bush's part, our opponents sought to prove some sort of 
quasi intent by making him responsible for a price war in 
the retail grocery business in Ogden. Their theory in 
this regard was that since a man must intend the ordinary 
consequences of his acts, and since a price war is the 
ordinary consequence of the use of S. & H. stamps, Mr. 
Bush must have intended to set off a price war in order 
to drive his weaker competitors out of business (R. 67-69). 
The testimony offered in support of this line of 
attack was signally unsuccessful. All that it showed was 
that on July 21, 1951, eight months or more after Mr. 
Bush had inaugurated his cash discount, Stimpson's 
Market, which had already established a record for price 
cutting and had been ordered to desist (R. 62), cut its 
prices 2¢ on everything that the Bush Super Market had 
in its windows; Bush cut to meet Stimpson, and so the 
prices went progressively lower for three days, after 
which Bush gave up and Stimpson's, returning to the old 
prices, established a 3% cash discount on everything in 
its store. About a month later, other large stores in 
Ogden established prices at 3% below Stimpson's hand-
bill or list prices (R. 72-73). 
If this constituted proof that the ordinary conse-
quence of the use of S. & H. cash discount stamps is to 
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cause a price war and that Mr. Bush must therefore be 
considered to have intended to incite such an event, it 
certainly took a long time to get started ( 8 months ! ) , and 
Mr. Bush showed very little stomach for it (about 3 
days!). What we really think the testimony showed, and 
no more, was that Stimpson's unnecessarily initiated a 
contest with Bush when all it needed to meet Bush's cash 
discount was a cash discount of its own which quickly 
restored its lost volume (R. 73). 
If the ordinary consequence of the use of S. & H. 
cash discount stamps were to incite a price war, there 
would be over 30,000 such price wars raging at the 
moment throughout the United States, but no such phe-
nomenon has come to our attention or was referred to at 
the trial, and no reference will be found to it in the cases. 
We should also point out, again, that if Mr. Bush 
violated the law when he issued S. & H. cash discount 
stamps, which we deny, he only did so perhaps once in a 
thousand sales, when 6% items alone were sold, and that 
it is absurd to suggest that such occasional sales could 
have engulfed the local grocery trade in a price war or 
that Mr. Bush could be held to have intended any such 
consequence. 
Furthermore, even assuming that there was a price 
war in the retail grocery business in Ogden and not just 
in the mind of counsel for the plaintiffs in intervention, 
no fault could be found with Mr. Bush if the "war" was 
inspired by his unquestionably legal use of S. & H. cash 
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discount stmnps on the bulk of his merchandise, nor could 
any fault be found with him in so far as the "war" re-
lated to items selling above the 6o/o level. At the very 
most, fault could be found with Mr. Bush to the extent 
that the "war" was inspired by his use of S. & H. cash 
discount stamps in connection with the sale of 6% mer-
chandise and only in so far as the "war" had the effect 
of cutting prices below the 6% level, where it would have 
run afoul of the Unfair Practices Act. On these matters 
the record is entirely silent and proof gives way to pure 
speculation. 
Plaintiffs' argument, step by step, is that because 
the so-called price war followed· defendant's use of cash 
discount stamps, it was caused by the stamps ; and be-
cause it was caused by the stamps, it was the ordinary 
consequence of the use of the stamps; and because it was 
the ordinary consequence of the use of the stamps, de-
fendant must have intended it to occur; and because a 
price war adversely affects the industry, it injures com-
petitors and destroys competition ; and because of this, 
defendant must be found to have made use of the stamps 
for the purpose of injuring his competitors and destroy-
ing competition. This is fantastic! 
When one considers that we are dealing with a penal 
statute and that a man is presumed to have acted with-
out wrongful intent until the contrary is proved, it is 
apparent that this whole phase of the evidence is weak, 
inconclusive, meaningless, and certainly inadequate and 
inappropriate to the task for which it was intended. 
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Even in its broadest construction, it proved nothing with 
respect to Mr. Bush's intent. 
(c) Plaintiffs failed to carry the burden of proving 
that defendant issued 8. & H. cash discount 
stamps for the purpose of injuring his com-
petitors and destroying competition. 
As we have already shown, supra, at page 45, the 
plaintiffs were required to prove that defendant's actual 
intent. in issuing S. & H. cash discount stamps was to in-
jure his competitors and destroy competition; and that, 
in lieu of such proof, it would not be enough to prove 
merely the e ff.ect of his use of the stamps. In final 
analysis, all they had to rely upon was their theory that 
it was wrong for Mr. Bush to issue cash discount stamps 
with 6% items because the effect was to sell merchandise 
below cost. This, however, was not enough to prove a 
wrongful intent, even if such sales were below cost. 
In Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Sawyers 
Stores, Inc., 114 Mont. 562, 568, 138 P. 2d 964, 968 (1943), 
the Court said : 
"The commission relied on its proof of the 
sales and the testimony of competitors as to the 
effect generally of price cutting as showing the 
unlawful intent. Proof of sales at less than cost, 
if that had been established by the evidence, would 
not in itself be proof of the unlawful purpose to 
injure competitors and destroy competition. No 
presumption of such purpose arises from the mere 
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fact of such a sale being made. It is necessary to 
go further and show other facts and circumstances 
that would furnish basis for a conclusion of the 
wrongful purpose.'' 
See: State v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 
201 P. 2d 1034 (1949); Great A. & P. Te.a Co. v. Ervin, 
23 F. Supp. 70 (1938) ; Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 
122 Colo. 263, 221 P. 2d 343 ( 1950). 
In truth and in fact, plaintiffs defaulted on the issue 
of intent and their counsel virtually admitted as much at 
the close of the whole case when, in a colloquy with the 
Court, he revealed that his real theory was that, if the 
Act were interpreted to forbid the use of cash discount 
stamps with 6% items, he would consider defendant to 
have had a wrongful intent (to have acted unfairly), but 
if the Act were interpreted not to forbid such a practice, 
he would consider defendant to have had no wrongful 
intent, no matter what consequences flowed from his use 
of the stamps. If this is a correct view of the matter, no 
useful purpose will ever be served by attempting to prove 
or disprove intent in such a case as this. 
The colloquy to which we refer and which shows that 
the Trial Court shared our opponent's erroneous view of 
the question of intent, may be set forth as follows: 
By the Court : ''Of course, purs1;1ing this line 
of thought a little bit further, it is obvious also if 
another competitor of Mr. Bush's engages in a 
program of selling and adapts himself to certain 
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facilities which may be available to him, that by 
the same token Mr. Bush is hurt just as much by 
that method as the other merchant is by Mr. 
Bush's.'' 
Mr. Rampton: "There is no question about 
that, your Honor, but the difference is this: Our 
legislature has set up certain things that they said 
are unfair. 
By the Court: That's right. 
Mr. Rampton: Now, things that are fair, that 
is legitimate competition. 
By the Court: That's right. 
Mr. Rampton: And you can't be blamed for 
hurting your competitor. 
By the Court: Eventually, you are going to 
have to decide whether Mr. Bush's method is un-
fair, and as a result the State law will have to be 
interpreted in that regard" (R. 225-226). 
This, we submit, is all there was to plaintiffs' prima 
facie case in so far as it related to intent. If cash dis-
count stamps were not proscribed by the Act, the Court 
and counsel for the plaintiffs would consider Mr. Bush's 
intent unobjectionable; but if stamps were proscribed, 
they would then consider his intent to have been wrong-
ful. Plaintiffs might as well have refrained from going 
into the question of intent at all. Their theory, we sub-
mit, was unsound; their proof, lacking. 
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POINT IV -THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
AND THE CORRESPONDING SECTIONS (AR-
TICLE I, SECS. 1 AND 7) OF THE STATE CON-
STITUTION. 
In our first three points we endeavored to show that 
defendant, in fact, never violated the Unfair Practices 
Act. 
We come now to our final point which has to do 
with the constitutionality of the Act. 
(a) The Act, if construed to cover ALL .of the costs 
of the credit ,and delivery merchatnt. but only 
SOME of the costs of the cash .a;nd oarry mer-
chant, is wnconstitutional. 
In Point I we argued that the statutory markup was 
intended to cover all of the costs of the cash and carry 
merchant, just as it was intended to cover ~all of the costs 
of the credit and delivery merchant. We ask the Court 
now to consider the constitutional consequence of reject-
ing that argument. 
If the statutory markup covers all of the costs of the 
credit and delivery merchant but only some of the costs 
of the cash and carry merchant, the statute clearly dis-
criminates against the latter in favor of the former. It 
is fundamental that, where, as here, there is no reason-
able basis for discriminating as between two classes of 
competing merchants, any statute which has such an 
effect is unconstitutional because it denies one of them 
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the equal protection of the law. (State v. H oltgreve, 58 
Utah 563, 571, 200 Pac. 894 (1921); M·ayflower Farms v. 
TenEyck, 297 U.S. 266, 80 L. Ed. 675 (1936).) 
In our opinion, Point I provides a complete answer 
to this law suit and it is one on which we would prefer 
to stand because it does not entail the invalidation of the 
Act, but, if we are overruled on Point I, we submit that 
the present point will be unanswerable: the statute can-
not be unfairly discriminatory and constitutional at the 
same time. 
(b) If a cash discount is :an element, of price r.ather 
than cost, the Act is unconstitutional because it 
makes no allowance for t.he difference in the 
overhead of the cas:h and carry merchant as com-
pared with the overhead of the credit and de-
livery merchant .. 
In Point II we argued that the function of a cash 
discount, as distinguished from a trade discount, is not 
to adjust price but to induce the purchaser to pay cash; 
that a cash discount affects the terms not the price. Here, 
again, we ask the Court to consider the constitutional 
consequence of rejecting our argument. 
Cash discount stamps are either an element of cost, 
as we think, or an element of price, as our opponents 
suggest, but not of both. No one suggests that stamps 
are at one and the same time elements of cost and price. 
If cash discount stamps are an element of cost, as we 
think, the cost of supplying them occupies the same place 
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in the overhead of the cash and carry merchant that the 
cost of extending credit occupies in the overhead of the 
credit and ·delivery merchant. In other words, the cost 
of a cash discount and the cost of extending credit are 
related. This view, which we have held from the outset 
of the present controversy, is reflected in the following 
quotation from Rosenkamp:ff and Wider in the ''Theory 
of Accounts'', page 486 : 
''The presence of the financial and time ele-
ments, furthermore, makes the [cash] discount 
earned closely approximate interest. This simi-
larity is even more pronounced in those cases 
where money is borrowed at the bank in order to 
take advantage of such purchase discounts. The 
interest paid on such borrowings is charged to 
interest expense and is treated as a deduction from 
income in the non-operating section of the income 
statement; hence, the cash discount on purchases 
should appear in the non-operating section as 
other income.'' 
If stamps are not an element of cost, it means that 
there is no financial expense for the cash and carry mer-
chant which corresponds to that element of the financial 
expense of the credit and delivery merchant which is at-
tributable to the extension of credit. It means that the 
cash discount allowed by the former does not figure as 
a non-operating expense but is reflected, instead, by a 
reduction in sales. The consequence of this is that the 
overhead of the cash and carry merchant is lower than 
the overhead of the credit and delivery merchant by 
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reason of the absence of this particular item of non-
operating expense, and, for this reason, the cash and 
carry merchant should be permitted to charge corres-
pondingly lower prices for his merchandise. For its 
failure to compensate for this difference, the statute is 
arbitrary and discriminatory in its effect, and, hence, 
contravenes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In Florida Dry Cleaning~ Laundry Board v. Ever-
glades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380 (1939), the 
Court had before it, the question of the reasonableness 
of laundry and dry cleaning prices fixed by a Florida 
Administrative Board. It held that, in determining 
prices the Board was under a duty to take into considera-
tion the differences in cost between credit and delivery 
establishments, on the one hand, and cash and carry 
establishments, on the other. 
In Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76 
N. E. 2d 91 (1947), the Court invalidated an Ohio 
statute prohibiting sales of cigarettes below cost because 
it failed to provide for the difference in overhead 
between the wholesaler of cigarettes who did business 
on the credit and delivery plan and the wholesaler 
who did business on the cash and carry plan. As in 
the case at bar, the statute defined "cost" to the whole-
saler as invoice or replacement cost less trade dis-
counts, except customary discounts for cash, plus an 
arbitrary markup in the absence of proof of a lower 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
actual cost. In invalidating the statute the Trial Court 
said, 
''The unreasonableness of the foregoing for-
mula [2% markup] appears in bold relief when it 
is considered that although the specified markup is 
inadequate to cover actual cost, nevertheless it con-
stitutes the. maximum markup required by the 
statute. Regardless of how much higher the whole-
saler's actual cost may be, he is not required 
to increase his markup to correspond thereto. 
This maximum markup of 2% is disproportion-
ally lower than actual maximum costs of Service 
Wholesalers and it bears no true relation to the 
average cost of all wholesalers. This is exem-
plified by the evidence and other data submitted 
to the court. 
''The differentials in cost of the two classes 
of wholesalers in question are ignored by the stat-
ute with the result that instead of minimum prices 
fairly based upon different costs, the same mini-
mum price is available to cash and carry and serv-
ice wholesalers alike." (Emphasis ours.) (74 N. E. 
2d 841, 849.) 
More recently, in Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 
A. 2d 267 (1951), the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
invalidated for this same reason a Maryland statute 
prohibiting sales below cost. The Maryland Act was in 
all material respects similar to the Utah Act now under 
discussion, and required wholesalers to apply a markup 
of 2% to cover overhead in the absence of direct evi-
dence of a lesser cost. For failure to make allowance 
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for the difference in overhead of the cash and carry 
wholesaler as compared with the credit and delivery 
wholesaler, the Court declared the Maryland statute 
·unconstitutional, saying, 
"We conclude that the Unfair Sales Act, par-
ticularly Section 112, as embodied in Section 113, 
is unreasonable, arbitrary and unjustly discrimina-
tory, as between plaintiffs and defendant" {p. 
278). 
In our opinion, Point II provides a complete answer 
to this lawsuit, and it is one on which we would prefer 
to stand because it does not entail the invalidation of the 
Act, but, if we are overruled on Point II, we submit that 
the present point will be unanswerable. If cash dis-
counts affect prices only, and do not figure as an ele-
ment of cost, the overhead of the cash and carry mer-
chant is thrown out of relation with the overhead of the 
credit and delivery merchant and there should be a com-
pensating factor in the Act which would permit the cash 
and carry merchant to charge lower prices. For want 
of it, the Act is unconstitutional. 
(c) The Act, if construed only to prohibit the use of 
8. <f; H. cash discount stamps, is unconstitutio'TIJal 
because it discriminates against a legitimate 
business. 
Counsel for the Utah Retail Grocers' Association, 
who carried nearly the whole burden of the trial for the 
plaintiffs, endeavored to make this enforcement proceed-
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ing appear to be a public spirited effort to save the retail 
grocery business in Ogden from the disintegrating and 
demoralizing effect of a price war incited by the defend-
ant's use of cash discount stamps (R. 67). 
We believe that we have already demonstrated that 
this is nonsense, but let us add to what we have already 
said on the subject at pages 49 to 52, supra, that the 
alleged price war did not even get under way until long 
after this proceeding had been initiated. 
The first step, apparently, was an effort on the part 
of the Retail Grocers Association to bring Mr. Bush into 
line, for that was the usual course (R. 91). 
The second step, apparently, was a complaint by Mr. 
Boyle, President of the Association, to Mr. Hale, Execu-
tive Secretary of the Trade Commission (R. 91-92). 
The third step, apparently, was a request by Mr. 
Hale to the Attorney General of Utah for an opinion with 
respect to whether the issuance of S . .& H. green trading 
stamps in connection with sales was a violation of the 
Fair Trade Act or the Unfair Practices Act (R. 129). 
The date of this request does not appear, but the opinion 
was issued on May 21, 1951. 
The fourth step, apparently, was an interview be-
tween Mr. Hale and the defendant's store manager, Mr. 
Winters (R. 129). This appears to have taken place on 
May 24, 1951, when Mr. Hale purchased certain 6% items 
(complaint, paragraph 3). 
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The fifth step, apparently, was the issuance of a 
cease and desist order by the Trade Commission. This 
took place on May 28. 
It was not until nearly two months later, July 21, 
1951, that Stimpson's first cut its prices in the opening 
round of the alleged price war (R. 72). 
With this chronology of events in mind it will be 
obvious that the talk of an alleged price war was in-
tended merely to obscure the real purpose of the proceed-
ing. The real purpose was not to rescue the retail 
grocery business from a price war nor to prevent Mr. 
Bush from issuing S. & H. cash discount stamps with 
6% items, but to compel him to give up the use of such 
stamps entirely. Here was the real animus : the Retail 
Grocers' Association wanted to drive S. & H. cash dis-
count stamps out of the retail grocery business in Ogden. 
Not only was the statute never intended for such a 
purpose but, if it had been it would clearly have been 
unconstitutional, for the business of The Sperry & 
Hutchinson Company in providing and redeeming its 
stamps, so that retail merchants and their customers 
may enjoy the benefits of a cooperative cash discount, is 
a legitimate business which serves a useful purpose and, 
hence, may not be made the subject of discriminatory 
legislation. As this Court said in State v. H oltgreve, 
58 Utah, 563, 572; 200 Pac. 894, 897 (1921), in striking 
down a tax which sought to discriminate against S. & H. 
stamps, 
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'' • • • In our judgment the great weight of 
authority is against the validity of laws which 
either directly or indirectly prohibit or unduly 
interfere with the right to use trading stamps such 
as are in question here and which are supplied for 
the purposes stipulated • • •. '' 
A host of other decisions upholding the use of cash 
discount stamps in the face of attack by special interests 
could be cited but the point is one which our opponents 
can hardly dispute and we shall therefore content our-
selves with the following quotations from one of the lead-
ing California decisions (Ex Parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 
82 Pac. 429 [1905] ) . 
"We see nothing in such a stamp or coupon 
which is outside of the constitutional rights of 
citizens to make contracts concerning property; 
nothing which wrongfully interferes with the law-
ful rights of other persons ; and nothing which the 
police power can reach as touching the public 
safety, the public health, or the public morals. 
(82 Pac. 429, 431.) 
• • • • 
''Indeed, an ordinary trading-stamp or cou-
pon is in substance a mere form of allowing dis-
counts on cash payments, and its issuance is 
entirely harmless and within the constitutional 
right of contract. It may be distasteful to certain 
competitors in business; but the latter should re-
member that if a statute suppressing it be upheld 
then other oppressive statutes might be enacted 
unlawfully interfering with and hampering busi-
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ness and the right of contract to which these com-
petitors would strenuously but vainly object." 
( 82 Pac. 429, 434.) 
Not only are we quite certain that the Unfair Prac-
tices Act was not intended to outlaw cash discount 
stamps, but we are satisfied that, if it had attempted such 
a thing, it would have to be declared unconstitutional. 
Their use may be regulated, as, indeed, it is (Title 96, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943) but not prohibited. 
(d) The Act, if construed to permit conviction upon 
proof, in the alternative, of a wrongful intent or 
a harmful ·effect., is unconstitutional. 
Section 16-A-4-7 of the Act provides that it shall be 
unlawful for any person to sell any article at less than 
cost ''for the purpose of injuring competitors and de-
stroying competition * * * or when the elf ect of selling 
* * * at less than cost may be substantially to lessen 
competition.'' Literally construed, it is evident that a 
retailer who made sales below cost without any purpose 
of injuring competitors or destroying competition could 
be convicted of a violation of the statute upon proof that 
the effect of his sales might be substantially to lessen 
competition. As we have indicated at pages 42-44, supra, 
the courts have repeatedly held that proof, in the alterna-
tive, of a wrongful purpose or a harmful effect is not 
enough: there must be proof of a wrongful purpose. 
Since our opponents, as we have indicated at page 44, 
supra, do not contest this point, we shall do no more here 
than to call the attention of the Court to Englebrecht v. 
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Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P. 2d 538 (1949), and Adwon v. 
Oklahoma Retailers Association, 204 Okla. 199, 228 P. 2d 
376 (1951). 
In the first of these cases, which contains a compre-
hensive review of the authorities, the Court invalidated 
the Unfair Sales Act of Oklahoma because it permitted 
conviction upon proof, in the alternative, of intent or 
effect. 
In the second, the Court sustained the Unfair Sales 
Act of Oklahoma after it had been amended so as to 
remove the objectionable alternative which permitted 
conviction without proof of intent. 
(e) The Act is unconstitutional in any event because 
it is so vagtte and Vndefinite that the ret:ail mer-
chant is unable to .ascertain when he is violating 
the law and, consequently, expositng !hims.elf to 
conviction of a misdemeanor atnd running the 
risk of a fine, imprisonment a;nd. liability for 
civil damages. 
The Utah Unfair Practices Act, like many of its 
fellows in other jurisdictions, was modeled on the Cali-
fornia Unfair Practices Act of 1935·, as amended in 1937, 
and is subject to the same constitutional shortcomings. 
The time for challenging such acts upon the ground that 
they exceed the police power of the state, seems to have 
passed (Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National 
Candy and Tobacco Co., Inc., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 82 P. 2d 3 
[1938]), but the time for challenging them for the in-
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definiteness and uncertainty of their regulatory provi-
sions is still very much with us. 
After reviewing the cases in which such challenges 
have been made, the author of "The Constitutionality of 
the Unfair-Practices Acts" in the Oregon Law Review to 
which we have already referred at page 41, supr.a, said: 
'' * * * in their present statutory forms, the enforce-
ment of these acts, in the absence of a standard (either 
within or without the acts) for resolution of the myriad 
problems of apportionment of overhead expense which 
confront every merchant, is so highly conjectural that, 
it is submitted, the prohibitions of the acts are too vague, 
arbitrary, and uncertain to be supportable under due 
process" (p. 263), and then went on to say that, "With-
out exception, every case which has sustained the sales-
below-cost provisions of an unfair-practices act has been 
based upon a record factually incomplete, the issue 
having arisen upon demurrer, motion, or certified ques-
tion. Under those circumstances the courts' reluctance 
to pronounce a violation of the principles of due process 
is understandable, and in some instances may have been 
justifiable. Other courts, in contrast have not needed 
the elucidation of a factual record of the insuperable 
obstacles confro~ting a merchant who attempts to comply 
with these statutes" ( p. 269). 
Considered against the background of the constitu-
tional struggle to which the foregoing attests, it is evi-
dent that the challenge leveled by the present defendant 
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at the present Act was a serious one; that it nearly suc-
ceeded below is equally evident from the following preg-
nant observation by the Trial Court: 
''From the evidence in this record, the Court 
makes the observation that the Unfair Practices 
Act of the State of Utah is lacking in definiteness 
as to an exact formula in fixing what is or what 
is not below cost of a great many items of mer-
chandise being bought and sold by merchants who 
operate merchandise stores such as the Bush 
Super Market; but that said indefiniteness is not 
sufficient to hold the act wholly unconstitutional'' 
(Memo Decision). (Emphasis ours.) 
In defining "cost to the retailer", the Act states 
(Section 16-A-4-7, subdivisions 3 and 4, as amended in 
1951): 
""" "" "" The term 'cost to the retailer', shall 
mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to the 
retailer within thirty days prior to the date of sale, 
or the date of offering for sale or the replacement 
cost of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever 
is lower * * *. 
'' * * * The term 'replacement cost' shall mean 
the cost per unit at which the merchandise sold or 
offered for sale could have been bought by the 
seller at any time within thirty days prior to the 
date of sale or the date upon which it is offered 
for sale by the seller if bought in the same quan-
tity or quantities as the seller's last purchase of 
the said merchandise.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
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We call the attention of the Court to this provision 
of the Act not only because it is an example of the in-
definiteness of the statutory prohibitions but also because 
it is a prohibition which lacks any rational relationship 
to actual costs. Such a formula was held, in Common-
wealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67 (1940), to 
render the Unfair Practices Act unconstitutional because 
of vagueness and the arbitrary disregard of actual cost. 
A very similar provision in the New Jersey Unfair Prac-
tices Act was held to be invalid in State v. Packard~Bam­
berger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d 291 (1939); see 
also, Great Atlwntic and Pacific Te.a Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. 
Supp. 70 ( 1938). 
The effect of this type of restriction is, first, that 
the retail grocer never knows whether he is violating the 
Act because he never knows what his "replacement cost" 
is unless he maintains a constant and accurate check on 
the market (State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308; 
113 P. 2d 650 (1941); Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Balti-
more Candy & T. Co., 178 Md. 38; 12 A. 2d 201 (1940) ), 
and, second, that he is prevented from making available 
to the consuming public the benefit of his legitimate fore-
sight or good fortune in buying at low prices com-
modities which remain on his hands for more than thirty 
days. Thus in Florida Dry Cle,a.ning & Laundry Board 
v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380 (1939) 
the Court said : 
''There is a distinct difference between de-
livery and the cash and carry aspect of the laundry 
and dry cleaning business. The n1anner and cost 
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of adn1inistration in each is materially different 
and those who prefer to patronize the cash and 
carry business are entitled to the advantage of this 
difference.'' 
To the same effect in Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 
A. 2d 267 (Md. 1951) 
"To say that Self-Service was selling below 
cost because it did not charge itself with, but gave 
its customers the benefit of, non-existent expenses 
which it saved by selling for cash and making no 
deliveries, would be as arbitrary and unfair as to 
require one dealer to charge as much for short 
tons as others charge for long tons'' ( 80A. 2d 267, 
273). 
While the statutes referred to in the foregoing cases 
are not identical to the Utah Act in its definition of cost, 
they each involved an attempt to impose a cost at vari-
ance with the actual cost and the courts invalidated them 
for that reason. The Utah Act, we submit, is invalid for 
the same reason. 
In further defining ''cost to the retailer'', the Act 
requires that the retailer add to his invoice (a) freight 
charges, if incurred, and (b) cartage, if incurred, and 
'' (c) a markup to cover a proportionate part of the cost 
of doing business • • •.'' Here, again, is an element 
of uncertainty, for there is no way whatever for the 
merchant to compute that "proportionate part of the 
cost of doing business" which he is to contribute either 
to the various classes of his merchandise or to the in-
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dividual items; and, in fact, there is no way that such a 
computation can be made (R. 192-193). 
What ''part of the cost of doing business'' should 
a retail grocer attribute to his canned vegetables as com-
pared to his fresh vegetables~ And what '' propor-
tionate part" should he attribute to canned beets, for 
example, as compared to canned tuna fish~ How should 
he allocate among the different items his rent, advertis-
ing expense, clerks' salaries, etc.? Should he allocate 
costs differently when the merchandise is on the counter 
instead of under the counter or on the shelves, or in the 
refrigerator? Should he make a different allocation to 
items that move slowly than to items which move 
rapidly? These questions illustrate the impossibility of 
making an apportionment as called for by the statute. 
Mr. Bush did not attempt such a thing (R. 150-151). 
Even to attempt such a thing would involve prohibitive 
bookkeeping expense. 
Finally, after defining "cost to the retailer" and 
prohibiting the retailer from selling below "cost", the 
statute goes on to provide (Sec. 16A-2-12(d)) that, "The 
provisions of this act shall not apply to any sale made: 
• • • {d) In an endeavor made in good faith to meet 
the legal prices of a competitor as herein defined selling 
the same article, product or commodity in the same 
locality or trade area.'' Here, we think, is a provision 
which makes the whole definition of ''cost'' completely 
meaningless, for, in fact, there is no way in which a 
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retailer can possibly ascertain ''the legal prices'' of a 
competitor (R. 153). To do such a thing he would 
have to be inforn1ed not only of the invoice or replace-
ment cost within thirty days of the commodity being 
sold by his competitor but he would also have to be 
informed of the actual overhead of his competitor and 
the method by which his competitor allocated hts over-
head to the commodity in question. To this information, 
the retailer has no access. 
For the foregoing reasons, we submit that the only 
way a retail merchant can be certain that he is not 
violating our Unfair Practices Act is to close the doors 
of his establishment and go out of business. 
POINT V-THE RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION 
WHICH IS THE REAL PARTY-PLAINTIFF IN 
THIS ACTION, HAS BEEN GUILTY OF PRICE 
FIXING IN VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 
AND, ACCORDINGLY, COMES TO COUR'T WITH 
UNCLEAN HANDS, AND FOR THAT REASON 
SHOULD BE DENIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, 
FOR THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT DOES NOT, 
AND COULD NOT, AUTHORIZE PRICE FIXING. 
If, as we believe, the Retail Grocers' Association is 
attempting here to fix prices in the retail grocery busi-
ness in general and, in that regard, to discipline Mr. 
Bush in particular, the Association is guilty of violating 
the Sherman Act, and, consequently, comes to Court with 
unclean hands. For that reason alone, it should be denied 
the injunctive relief which it seeks. There is no doubt, 
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of course, that we are dealing here with interstate com-
merce (R. 132). 
As the United States Circuit Court pointed out in 
Food and Orocery Bureau v. United States, 139 F. 2d 
973 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), it is one thing to take joint action 
to see that the members of a trade association do not 
violate an unfair practices act by selling below cost with 
the intent to injure competitors and destroy competition, 
but it is quite another thing to take such action for the 
purpose of :fixing prices without regard to intent, for, in 
the :first place, the Act does not forbid sales below cost, 
per se, but only sales below cost with a wrongful intent, 
and, in the second place, such conduct on the part of a 
trade association amounts to price fixing which clearly 
violates the Sherman Act when applied to goods moving 
in interstate commerce. As the Court said, 
''The cases cited by the district judge in one of 
his rulings sustain his holding that agreements 
stabilizing such prices either at a maximum or a 
minimum or through a formula violate the Sher-
man Act." (Citing many cases.) (p. 978.) 
The activities of the Food and Grocery Bureau which 
were held to amount to price :fixing are described in the 
Opinion as follows : 
''The Bureau served some thousands of 
Southern California Retailers of food and gro-
ceries with frequent statements of minimum prices 
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at which particular items of the trade should be 
sold (p. 975). 
• • • • 
''The Bureau also was actively engaged in 
investigating the prices of retailers, both mem-
bers and others, and in putting pressure on them 
not to sell below the cost of [or] price lists which 
it circulated. In this, appellants claim, they were 
doing no more than the policing of the California 
Act. 
''There is abundant evidence that for a period 
from 1935 to 1941, the corporation [the Bureau] 
and its president and two executive secretaries 
conspired to compel the Bureau members and 
others to sell food and groceries at not less than 
minimum prices circulated by the Bureau regard-
less of whether such sales were with the intent to 
injure a competitor or divert trade from him'' 
(p. 975). 
Needless to say, the activities of the Utah Retail 
Grocers Association precisely follow those of the Cali-
fornia grocers' association, as outlined above, and for 
the same reasons constituted price fixing. The closeness 
of the parallel is accentuated by the fact that one of the 
avowed purposes of the California association was ''to 
bring to an end the disastrous price war now raging 
here.'' In other words, it offered the same excuse for 
its price fixing activities. 
Notwithstanding his protestation that his Associa-
tion did not attempt to fix any prices in any way and 
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that it had no enforcement ability at all (R. 73}, it was 
apparent that the witness Boyle, President of the Ogden 
Retail Grocers Association, considered that it was part 
of his duty as President of the Association, to "keep 
the grocers in line on violations" (R. 82), and, par-
ticularly to police the price of 6% items (R. 90-91); and 
there was not one word of testimony to indicate that the 
question of intent was ever considered. The only dif-
ference between the present case and the Food and 
Grocery Bureau case seems to be that, in the present 
case the Association conducted its price fixing activities 
with the active cooperation of our Trade Commission. 
In practice, it appeared that the Association policed 
prices on a cooperative basis and only went to the Trade 
Commission when a merchant, like Mr. Bush, refused to 
take his orders from the Association. In such a case, as 
the present litigation illustrates, the Commission would 
then issue a cease and desist order and, upon non-com-
pliance, institute an enforcement proceeding. At that 
point, the Association would actively intervene and its 
counsel would, to all intents, conduct the prosecution. 
If there was any difference in substance between the 
activities of the Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern 
California and the activities of the Utah Retail Grocers 
Association, we fail to perceive it. 
The only question left unanswered by the Food and 
Grocery Bureau case was whether price fixing in inter-
state commerce could be sanctioned under state law. The 
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United States Circuit Court, in the Food and Grocery 
case, avoided that question by pointing out that the Cali-
fornia Unfair Practices Act was not a price fixing act and, 
therefore, no one could claim that it was intended to 
sanction such a thing. In the case at bar, we think it 
is not only plain that the Utah Act, like its California 
prototype, was not intended to sanction price fixing 
but we now have the benefit of Schwegmann Bros. v. 
Calvert Distillers, 341 U. S. 384, 386, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 
L. Ed. 1035 (May 21, 1951), where the Supreme Court 
noted that the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for indi-
viduals to enter into any agreement, express or implied, 
limiting or :fixing prices, such price fixing being unlawful 
per se; and then commented that, 
''The fact that a state authorizes the price 
fixing does not, of course, give immunity to the 
scheme absent approval by Congress.'' 
Accordingly, we respectfully submit that injunctive 
relief should have been denied in the case at bar because 
the plaintiffs, being in violation of the Sherman Act, 
came to court with unclean hands. The Unfair Practices 
Act not only did not and could not authorize price fixing, 
but was never intended to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant made no sales below "cost", as defined 
by the Act. 
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Defendant's allowance of cash discounts, through 
the use of cash discount stamps, did not have the effect 
of reducing prices. 
Defendant made no sales ''for the purpose of in-
juring competitors and destroying competition.'' 
If the Act is construed to prohibit the issuance of 
cash discount stamps with 6% merchandise, it is uncon-
stitutional; and so it is, in any event, because it violates 
the due process and equal protection clauses of our State 
and Federal constitutions. 
Plaintiffs in intervention come to Court with unclean 
hands. 
April 5, 1952. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATHOL RAWLINS, 
c. E. HENDERSON, 
of RAY, RAwLINs, JoNES & HENDERSON, 
.Attorneys for Defendant-.A.ppella!nt. 
R. R. BuLLIVANT, 
of the Oregon Bar, 
of Counsel. 
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